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The Politics of Toleration: The Establishment Clause
and the Act of Toleration Examinedt
LAuRA ZWlCKER*

INTRODUCTION

The complete separation of church and state is one of the abiding myths
of modem American constitutional theory and thought. The insistence on
that separation has long been the source of important judicial and legislative
decisions in such areas as the role of prayer in schools,' government support3
of parochial education 2 and the display of religious symbols in public spaces.
The establishment clause of the American Bill of Rights is commonly
understood to be the source of this wall of separation; 4 yet, such a wall
was never intended by its framers.
The establishment clause in the American Bill of Rights (1789) and the
English Act of Toleration (1689) are often interpreted and commonly
understood as legislative efforts to promote religious liberty. On closer
examination, however, it seems that both were significant political tools
whose primary importance was in achieving political stability after the
turmoil of revolution. The political nature and utility of the Act of Toleration, and m turn, of the establishment clause, is striking.5 Yet, the political
nature of these documents is even more obvious when seen in the context
of the history of toleration declarations from the Declaration of Breda
t © 1991 by Laura Zwicker.
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1988,
Washington Umversity.

I. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).

2. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
3. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion"); see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). It was in fact Thomas
Jefferson, in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association some thirteen years after the Bill of
Rights was drafted, who first used the phrase "wall of separation between church and state."
See L. Lvy, Jr-amsoN & CIViL LmERms: THE DARxm SIm 7-8 (1963).

5. William III begins his 1689 Act of Toleration by stating "some ease to scrupulous
consciences in the exercise of religion may be an effectual means to unite their Majesties'
Protestantsubjects in interest and affection." 8 ENGLISH MHsToRicAL DocutmNTs: 1660-1714,

at 400 (A. Browning ed. 1953) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ENGLISH HsroMiAL DocUmErrs].
In the congressional debates on the establishment clause, Delegate Carroll asserted that the

establishment clause "would tend more toward conciliating the minds of the people to the
Government than almost any other amendment." 1 ANALs oF CoNG. 730 (J. Gales ed. 1834)
(emphasis added).
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(1660) to the Act of Toleration itself. 6 While these documents all profess a
desire to grant "liberty of tender conscience '

7

all came into being at

moments of political crisis or show an express awareness of the need for
political unity and stability 8 In the English documents the very language
used suggests the primacy of political conformity and unity over religious

toleration. 9
There are, of course, differences in the historical and political circumstances that gave birth to the Act of Toleration and the establishment clause,
but there are also striking similarities. The most striking of the similarities

between 1689 and 1789 is the state of political turmoil and the urgent need
for unity. The Act of Toleration was declared after the demise of the
legitimate monarch, the invasion of England by the armed Dutch Staatholder, William of Orange, and his "election" to the English crown. The
American establishment clause was drafted in the wake of a revolutionary
war and the failure of the Articles of Confederation to bind the disparate

colomes into a unified nation.
An understanding of the political origins and uses of toleration declarations may provide an important guide to that part of the American juris-

prudential community concerned with original intent. This understanding is

6. See 8 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DocUMENTs, supra note 5, at 57 (the Declaration of Breda);
id. at 371 (Charles II's 1662 Declaration in Favor of Toleration); id. at 387 (Charles II's 1672
Declaration of Indulgence); id. at 395 (James II's 1687 Declaration of Indulgence); id. at 400
(William III's 1689 Act of Toleration).
7. See THE STUART CONSTITUTION 1603-1688: DoCUMENTs AND CoaNTARY 379 (J.
Kenyon ed. 1986) [hereinafter THE STUART CoNsTITUTIoN] (His Majesty's declaration to all his
loving subjects, 26 December 1662 (Charles II)). This was a phrase widely used in English
political discourse in the 17th century to refer to religious liberty.
8. Charles II was at war in 1672 (war was declared on March 13, 1672). J.JONES, COURT
AND CouNmY: ENGLAND, 1658-1714, at 106 (1978). James II understood that because of his
religion, and his desire to include Catholics in the political power structure, he could not rely
on the Anglican Establishment alone for support. 3. MILLER, JAMES II: A STUDY IN KINGSHIP
169-75 (1978). William III, like Charles II, was at war and in need of full support of his
country when his Act of Toleration was promulgated. H. HoRwrrz, PARLIAmNr, PoLIcY AND
PoLrncs IN THE REION OF WILLIAM III 27-28 (1977).
9. See 8 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 5, at 57-58 (Declaration of Breda:

"IT]he times have produced several opimons in religion, by which men are engaged in parties
and ammosities against one another, which, when they shall unite
will be better composed
"); Charles II's 1672 Declaration of Indulgence:
[W]e do now accordingly issue this our declaration, as well for the quieting the
minds of our good subjects
and for the better encouragement of all to a
cheerful following of their trade and callings, from whence we hope by the
blessing of God to have many good and happy advantages to our government
Id. at 387; id. at 371-73 (Charles I's 1662 Declaration in Favor of Toleration); id. at 295
(James Il's 1687 Declaration of Indulgence: "[T]here is nothing now that we so earnestly
desire as to establish our government on such a foundation as may make our subjects happy,
and unite them to us by inclination as well as duty
"); id. at 400 (William III's
1689
Act of Toleration: "[Slome ease to scrupulous consciences in the exercise of religion may be
an effectual means to unite their Majesties' Protestant subjects
").
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important not only because of the parallels between English and American
toleration declarations, but also because of the American awareness of the
English "precedent." A jurisprudence of original intent must recognize that
the establishment clause was neither intended to erect a wall of separation
between church and state nor to prevent individual states from regulating
religion, as the Supreme Court has frequently suggested.' 0 However, this
recognition is not enough. A jurisprudence of original intent must also
recognize that the framers explicitly intended to promote political and social
harmony through the establishment clause. 1' Onginalists must therefore
acknowledge that any governmental intrusion into matters of religion that
creates political and social discord would not comport with original intent
and therefore must be validated through activist jurisprudence.
I.
A.

Tim ACT oF TOLERATION

The Historical Context of the Act of Toleration

In 1689 England embarked on a course of social retrenchment and political
reclamation and reform. The Glorious Revolution, as the events of 1689
were later dubbed by Whiggish istorians, was a reaction to the rule of
James Il-the first Roman Catholic monarch to rule England in almost 150
years.' 2 Through a series of political maneuvers, James II had attempted to
displace the Anglican power elite.' 3 In November of 1689 that elite deposed
the Catholic king who had threatened their power and prerogatives. In Ins
place they imported his Protestant son-in-law and daughter, William and
14
Mary, to take the throne.
The Glorious Revolution was spun from a web of political and religious
motives, and these motives are difficult to separate from the religious claims
and reasons which were often used to cover political and economic goals.
While the most common contemporary explanation for deposing James II

10. See, e.g., McGowm v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952); Everson, 330 U.S. 1. While in more recent cases the Court has backed away from
using the "wall of separation" language, its spirit lives in the Lemon three-pronged analysis,
see infra notes 146-58 and accompanying text, especially in the third prong which prohibits

excessive entanglement of the government in religious matters. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971); see also, e.g., County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. 3086; Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578 (1987); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
11. See I ANNALS OF CoNo., supra note 5, at 730.

12. Mary Tudor (Mary I) was the first Roman Catholic monarch in England after her
father Henry VIII broke from the Roman Catholic Church and established the Protestant

Church of England. Mary I reigned from 1553 to 1558. See R. SMUTs, CoURT,

CuLTURE AND

Tim ORiGINs Op A RoYAIT TRADmoN iN EARLY STuART ENGLAND 2 (1987).

13. See H. HoRWIZ, supra note 8, at 5; J.

MILLER,

supra note 8, at 169-75; J. MILLER,

PoPERY AND PoLmcs N ENGLAND: 1660-1688, at 209-13, 218-28 (1973).

14. See H. HORWITZ, supra note 8, at 5, 13-14.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:773

was his Catholicism," it was not James' spiritual practices or beliefs that
were worrisome to the Anglican elite. Rather, it was his promotion of the
Roman Catholic Church, his attempts to insinuate his co-religiomsts into
the power structure of English life 6 and the threat of Catholic monarchy
in perpetuity-realized with the birth of James Francis Edward Stuart in
June of 168817-that worried the Anglican elite.
The traditional English fears of Catholicism in the seventeenth century
were legion, and those who supported William skillfully played upon those
fears. 8 The English were reminded of the bloody religious persecution they
had suffered under the last Roman Catholic monarch, Mary I, 19 and the
series of crises, or supposed crises, fomented by Jesuits: the Gunpowder
Plot (1605), the Civil Wars (1642-46), the Great Fire of London (1666) and
the Popish Plot (1678). These Catholic plots, a constant thread in the
propaganda against James II after 1685, were used to bring home the threat
to Protestant liberty that this king, and all subsequent Catholic kings, would
pose. 2 While the pamphlets cried out for political and religious liberty it
was clear that Catholics, dissenting sectanans and Jews were not to be
included.
Religion, as always, was a pliant and useful talking point. But what the
Whigs and Tones who banded together to effect the revolution feared most
was the loss of the Anglican monopoly on institutional powers: church
authority, as well as mimsterial, legal, social and educational power. 2' James
II clearly threatened the Anglican monopoly not only through the promotion
of his co-religiomsts by means of the royal dispensing powers, 22 but also
by proposing a general religious toleration in his Declaration of Indulgence
(1687).2 3

To the Anglican elite the Declaration of Indulgence was dangerous on
two levels. Enacted, it would have allowed those who refused commumon
in the Anglican Church to take royal offices that had been exclusively

15. See J. JoaNs, supra note 8, at 248.
16. See H. HoRwrrz, supra note 8, at 5; J. MILLER, supra note 8, at 169; J. MNi.xa,
supra note 13, at 209-13, 218-28.
17. See H. HoRwrrz, supra note 8, at 4-5 , J. JoNEs, supra note 8, at 247 (James Francis
Edward Stuart, the son of James II, was born on June 10, 1688); see also 5 Pomps oN AFFARs
oF STATE: 1688-1697, at 19-36 (W Cameron ed. 1971) (Popular expressions of the fear of a
Catholic monarchy in perpetuity are to be found in these contemporary satires.).
18. See J. JoNas, supra note 8, at 247-48; J. MILLER, supra note 13, at 252-57
19. See J. MLER,supra note 13, at I.
20. See J. Jo.ms, supra note 8, at 248-49.
21. See id.at 234-350.
22. See id.at 231; J. MHLER, supra note 8, at 128, 256-57; Tim STUART CoNsTrruTioN,
supra note 7, at 377 & n.45, 378, 395. Notably, James II mentions his royal dispensing power
in his 1687 Declaration of Indulgence. Id. at 395-97
23. See 8 ENGLISH HisroiucAL Docum Nrs, supra note 5, at 395.
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Anglican domain since the imposition of the Test Act of 1673.24 Further,
the Declaration of Indulgence would have gained James II the sympathy

and support of the large minority of dissenting Protestants, who had been
politically and socially disenfranchised since the Restoration of 1660, thus
shoring up his kingship and policies against attack by the Anglican major-

ity.25

With the "Revolution"

completed, William III came to the English

crown-the head of the English body politic. Because of the circumstances
of James II's flight and because of his own arrival at the head of an
invading army, William was immediately faced with the task of achieving

political legitimacy and authority. William needed to retain the cooperation
of both Whigs and Tones and the support of those Protestant dissenters

who had favored the revolution. But, because of the need for social and
political unity, he also had to attract those Protestant dissenters who had
favored James' efforts at toleration without sacrificing the support of the

Anglican elite and the broader base of the established church. As William
faced these conflicting political interests the Act of Toleration must have

seemed an obvious tool to resolve them. Through religious toleration William
could garner the support of many of those Englishmen who had been
politically disenfranchised and alienated from the crown and its government

since the Restoration of 1660.
Both Charles II and James II had appreciated the potential for political

unification through toleration before William,2 but Charles and James had
not gained the necessary parliamentary support. 27 William succeeded where
the previous two monarchs had failed because he was careful not to insist
on an overly general toleration. Instead, the Act he accepted was just barely
broad enough in scope to achieve his political purposes. The scope of

24. Id. The Test Acts of 1673 and 1678 required all office holders-this included seats m
Parliament as well as commissions in the Army and Navy-to take commumon in the Anglican
Church. See id. at 390, 392.
25. See J.Jo NEs, supra note 8, at 236; J. MILLER, supra note 13, at 217.
26. See 8 ENGUsH HsToRicAL DocumErNs, supra note 5, at 57 (The Declaration of Breda
(1660)); id. at 371 (Charles II's 1662 Declaration in Favor of Toleration); zd. at 387 (Charles
I's 1672 Declaration of Indulgence); id. at 395 (James II's 1687 Declaration of Indulgence).
In fact, John Miller suggests that James II "was not a genuine believer in toleration. His
concessions to Dissent were dictated by political expediency." J. MILLER, supra note 13, at
228.
27. J.R. Jones explains that Charles II's "announcement of the Declaration of Indulgence,
on 26 December 1672, produced a political explosion." J. JONES, supra note 8, at 150. Charles
Il's 1672 Declaration of Indulgence similarly failed in Parliament. See id. at 177-78. And in
1673 the first Test Act was passed, it would seem, as a backlash against Charles II's Declaration
of Indulgence. See Schochet, The Act of Toleration: Persecution, Non-Conformity, and
Religious Indifference, forthcoming in TH WORLD OF WxII AND MARY (1991) (copy of
unpublished manuscnpt on file with the Indiana Law Journal). For a description of the
immediate political backlash from James II's 1687 Declaration of Indulgence, which eventually
lead to lus loss of the Crown, see J.JONES, supra note 8, at 237-38.
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William's toleration was purely Protestant,2 while Charles II and James II
had both hoped to embrace Catholics as well as Protestants in their
toleration.
That William proposed a scheme of toleration which encompassed only
some Trinitarian Protestants suggests that liberty of conscience and unmolested worship were not first on his agenda. If religious scruple motivated
the Act of 1689, it is odd then that the Act was limited to Tnnitanan
Protestants, and of them, only to those willing to accept thirty-six of the
thirty-mne Articles of the Anglican faith, to swear an oath of allegiance to
the throne and declare their abhorrence of Catholicism. The circumscribed
scope of the 1689 Act suggests some motive other than religious liberty
The immediate histoncal context of William III's 1689 Act of Toleration
was James II's Declaration of Indulgence of two years earlier and James'
campaign to arrange a parliament that would support the royal policies on
toleration. 29 Iromcally, William's Act of Toleration begins with language
almost identical to that used by James in 1687, 30 language alluding to the
political utility of religious freedom. Through this language both monarchs
hoped to achieve political stability and gain the support of their subjects;
yet William succeeded in unification where James only succeeded in creating
factions, tensions and alienation. 3
James' failure, in part, was due to contemporary political circumstances
beyond his control. One such circumstance was the revocation of the Edict
of Nants, an "irrevocable" promise by the French kings to respect and
tolerate their Protestant subjects, only six months after James ascended the
English throne.12 It must have occurred to English Protestants that if one
Catholic king could ignore ins oath and persecute Protestant subjects it was

28. In his 1689 Act of Toleration, William III explicitly states that he is promulgating this

Act to "unite their Majesties' Protestantsubjects." 8 ENGLISH HIsToiucAL

DocuMNTlS,

supra

note 5, at 400 (emphasis added). William goes on in this Act to lay out measures that explicitly
excluded all non-Tnnitanan Protestants from its scope. See id. at 400-03.
29. See J. JoiNs, supra note 8, at 241; J. MILLER, supra note 13, at 217-36.
to
30. James II began his 1687 Declaration of Indulgence "we so earnestly desire
establish our government on such a foundation as may make our subjects happy, and unite
them to us by inclination as well as duty." 8 ENGLISH HISToICAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 5,
at 395. William III's 1689 Act of Toleration began with "some ease to scrupulous consciences
m the exercise of religion may be an effectual means to unite their Majesties' Protestant
subjects." Id. at 400.
31. See J. MI,.LL, supra note 13, at 228.
32. The Edict of Fontainebleau, issued by Louis XIV in October, 1685, revoked the Edict
of Nants which promised toleration to the French Protestants. The Edict of Nants was intended
to be irrevocable. Thus, the revocation by a monarch sworn to its maintenance shocked English
Protestants who wondered if they could take a sworn Catholic monarch at his word. See J.
KENYON, STuAT ENoLA.N 234 (1978); R. Thomas, Comprehension and Indulgence, in FROM
UN FoRmIrY TO UNITY 232 (1962). John Miller suggests that "[m]emones of the reign of Queen
Mary and the present experience of that of Louis XIV combined to give a frightening picture
of the behaviour of Papists in power towards their Protestant subjects." J. MuJLER, supra
note 13, at 1.
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not unlikely that another would fail to keep his word. But James' failure
to achieve national and Parliamentary approval of toleration was also due
to his own stubbornness and his failure to take account of political reality.
James continued a program of placing Roman Catholic supporters into
important numsterial33 and military 34 positions; he attempted to force Magdalen College, Oxford to elect a Roman Catholic president; 3s and he
prosecuted "the Seven Bishops ' 36 despite an inevitable political backlash.
By forcing Catholics into the positions of power traditionally reserved for
the Anglican elite James turned the Anglican majority, a power base
necessary for any political action, against himself and his policies.
James' attempts to comprehend Catholics within English society and
politics were enough in themselves to have alienated Protestant England
almost entirely. However, James did not end Ins campaign for Catholic
power there. In 1687 James declared a general indulgence for all those not
belonging to the Church of England. This Declaration of Indulgence, and37
the support from the Protestant dissenters that it brought to the crown,
fractured the English Protestant community and had the potential to lead
to political turmoil. William had to repair this split between Protestant
dissenters and Anglicans, or at least paper it over for Is kingship to
succeed. Not only did the rhetoric of a "Protestant saviour of a Protestant
country" demand that William restore the unity of his Protestant subjects
resources of a
for reasons of royal image, but William also needed the
38
unified country to prosecute a successful war in Ireland.
B.

William III and His Act of Toleration

The motives and purposes of those who supported the 1689 Act of
Toleration must have been mixed. Doubtless some supporters of the Act,
both inside and outside of Parliament, were concerned with the spiritual,
rather than the political, meamngs and consequences of toleration. These
men may have supported William's Act believing that some measure of
religious toleration was better than none at all, or hoping that this Act
would be a first step toward more complete religious toleration. However,
William's aims for and uses of an Act of Toleration must have been

33. See J. MILLR, supra note 13, at 218-28.
34. James intended to expand and remodel his army to increase the "proportion of catholic
officers, which had been less than twelve percent in 1687." J. JoNES, supra note 8, at 247.
35. See Magdalen College and King James II, in OxroRw HiSTo RiCAL Socmry 6 (J. Bloxam
ed. 1886).
36. The Seven Bishops were Anglican Bishops who had refused to read James' Declaration
of Indulgence from their pulpits. See J. JoNes, supra note 8, at 239-40.

37. The 1687 Declaration appealed to Protestant Dissenters who had been politically
disenfranchised since the Restoration. See J. NuIBR, supra note 8, at 272-73.
38. See H. HoRwrrz, supra note 8, at 27-28.
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grounded in a desire to stabilize the country and his kingship, to achieve a
national. Protestant unity.
Early in the Convention of 1689, an assembly William called together in
place of the disbanded Parliament, William addressed both houses of the
former Parliament on the question of religious tests for office. He emphasized the necessity of restoring the government to a state of normalcy as
soon as possible: "I am with all the expedifion I can, filling up the vacancies
that are in Offices and Places of trust, by this Revolution." 39 Inthe same
address, he stressed the importance of Protestant unification to the political
health of England, urging Parliament to "leave room for the Admission of
all Protestants that are willing and able to serve. This conjunction in my
service, will tend to the better uniting you among yourselves, and the
strengthening you against your common adversanes." 4° William spoke m
explicitly political language while dealing with an explicitly religious subject.
He did not suggest any concern for the spiritual lives and consciences of
his subjects in his objection to a narrow religious test, but rather, the
political health and stability of his nation.
In urging that the new religious test for office be broad enough to allow
Protestant dissenters to take office, William undoubtedly aimed at garnering
the support of the large dissenting population of Protestants that had been
barred from office for almost thirty years. Not ummportantly, he must also
have been intending to make room in the new government for his Dutch
supporters. 41 While William made his desire for toleration clear to Parliament, he was also careful to distinguish himself from his Catholic fatherin-law, James II. He assured Parliament, "I doubt not but you will
sufficiently provide against Papists" before asking them to reconsider the
place of Protestant dissenters in English government.4 2 Here William allowed
a glimpse of the political purposes behind the later Act of Toleration,
purposes that were obscured by the subsequent popularization of the Act
in religious terms. In this address William urged neither the comprehension
of Protestant dissenters into the Church of England nor the suspension of
the penal laws that encumbered them. He simply asked that they be allowed
43
to participate in government.

39. 5

W

TO TmE YEAR

COBBETT, TiE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EAR.IEST PERIOD
1803, at 184 (T.Hansand ed. 1809) [hereinafter TE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES].

40. Id.
41. The 1673 Test Act would have barred all of William's Dutch favorites from holding
office. 8 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DocUmErNs, supra note 5, at 390-91. The 1678 Test Act would
have prevented those Dutchmen whom William had granted noble status from taking their
seats in the House of Lords unless they were willing to take an oath subscribing to the
Anglican church. Id. at 391-94. William's Act of Toleration, however, allowed these men to
take office to support the new king's government while remaining outside the Church of
England. Id.
42. Tr PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, supra note 39, at 184.
43. Id.
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William was not the only political actor to have seen the advantages of
a limited form of toleration in 1689. The Earl of Nottingham also understood its political benefits; he hoped that a limited toleration "would reunite
Anglicans and moderate Dissenters and so prevent any future attempts to
divide the 'Protestant interest' in England as both Charles II and James II
had sought to do."4' John Hampden, chairman of the Select Committee
on the Bill for Comprehension, likewise saw the useful effects of political
unification through religious toleration. He urged that the political benefits
of toleration not be undermined by limiting the Act to a period of seven
years, because such a limit would trouble Protestant dissenters and damage
the sense of Protestant community. 4 Hampden might also have been worried
that the political purpose behind the Act would have been too blatant were
it limited to such a short term of years.
The Act of Toleration enabled William to unite English Protestants behind
his throne because it appeased both Protestant dissenters and the Anglican
majority. The 1689 Act of Toleration admitted Protestant dissenters into
the political arena from which they had been virtually excluded since the
Restoration of 16604 while their admission was restncted enough not to
alarm Anglicans. The Act of Toleration addressed the role of dissenting
Protestants in the English government after the Revolution Settlement of
1689; however, it is also important that it addressed the standing of
dissenting Protestants in the English religious community. 47
It is not clear from either its language or its history whether the Act's
concessions to freedom of worship were included to render its political
nature more palatable or because there were some members of the Convention who hoped to use the Act as a step toward a more complete toleration.
Here the strands of political and religious motive are closely intertwined
and difficult to separate. This intertwining of motives may be interesting
to the legal histonan seeking the intent of the framers; however, it may not
have been so important to seventeenth-century Protestant dissenters. What
was important to dissenting Protestants, and what created a sense of unity
in 1689, was that Protestant dissenters were allowed to hold political office
and to attend religious services at a church other than the Church of
England.4 It is true that the scope of the Act of Toleration was clearly

44. H. HoRwrrz, supra note 8, at 24.
45. See Ti PARLIAANTARY DEfATES, supra note 39, at 266.
46. Dissenters were excluded from holding offices in corporations by the Corporation Act
(1661). Tim STuART CoNsTrunON, supra note 7, at 351. The Uniformity Act (1662) required
mimsters to adhere to Anglican rituals and the Book of Common Prayer. Id. at 353-56. The
Test Act of 1673 required all office holders to take sacrament in the Anglican Church. Id. at
385-86. The Test Act of 1678 required all members of Parliament to take sacrament in the
Anglican Church. Id. at 386-87.
47. See 8 ENGLIsH HisroiucAL Docummtrs, supra note 5, at 400-03.
48. Id.
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limited to Trinitarian Protestants, perhaps to avoid the tensions created by
the broader attempts of Charles II and James II, or perhaps because William
had no personal or political interest m extending toleration to other groups.4 9
Yet, the Act swept broadly enough to include m the new political community
the unpopular-but influential-Baptists and Quakers. 0
William maintained the vital support of the Anglican majority because
the Act of Toleration granted toleration of only a very narrow scope. The
official title of the 1689 Act reveals its limited nature: "An Act for
Exempting Their Majesties' Protestant Subjects Dissenting from the Church
of England from the Penalties of Certain Laws. ' 5 1 Clearly, the Act was
not intended to extend unlimited religious liberty to all Englishmen. The
Act applied only to dissenting Protestants, and only exempted those men
.from the penalties of the Clarendon Code-significantly it did not repeal
those penal laws.5 2 Further, the Act extended only to Trinitarian Protestants
willing to take the oaths required by an "Act for removing and preventing
all questions and disputes concerning the assembling and sitting of this
present Parliament,"3 to subscribe to the declaration in an "Act to prevent
papists from sitting in either House of Parliament"- and who adhered to
thirty-six of the tlhrty-mne Articles of the Anglican Church."
The High-Churchmen, and the members of the Tory-Anglican establishment, were not interested in granting any kind of true religious liberty to
Protestant dissenters, let alone to Roman Catholics, Turks and Jews. The
Act of Toleration shows to what extent these men in power were able to
preserve the traditional hierarchy while under great pressure from William
to soften the requirements for adnussion into the power structure. As
Gordon Schochet noted:
The Act of Toleration does not represent the triumph of righteous
principle over narrow interest. Quite the contrary, it was the result of
the continued pursuit of personal gain by members of the Tory-Anglican
establishment, by men whose policies of persecution had failed to
eliminate the non-conformist menace and who were apparently alarmed
by the prospect of having to share status, place, and power with their
enemies. Preserving the penal laws-and especially the Test Act-was
not an act of defiance or even desperation; it was part of a calculated
plan to preserve as much as possible of the traditional society and its
distribution of power.s6

49. As the Act of Toleration stood, its scope was broad enough to include his Dutch
followers.
50. 8 ENOLISH HisTORcAL. DOCUmENTS, supra note 5,at 402-03.
51. Id. at 400.
52. Id. at 400-01.
53. Id. at 401 (emphasis in original).
54. Id. (emphasis in original).
55. Id.at 402.
56. Schochet, supra note 27.
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The Act of Toleration succeeded in achieving some measure of political
unity and stability precisely because the religious concessions it made were
very limited.
Both 1689 and 1789, first and foremost, were moments of political, rather
than religious, crisis. Whatever the religious principles and convictions of
the framers of the Act of 1689 and the establishment clause, the parties to
those acts understood the political importance of the practice of religion,
the fact of dissent and the fear of tyranny and absolutism in the spiritual
realm. The religious content and the religious rationale of these declarations
can best be understood as aspects of political conformity and as responses
to the religious fears and fervor in both nations. The language of religious
liberty was more appealing and more persuasive -than the language of
political conformity with its connotations of foreign absolutism. In publicizing "liberty of tender conscience" the framers of the Act of Toleration
and of the establishment clause were able to promote political unity without
exposing themselves to charges of political coercion.
II.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The establishment clause was framed at a time of political crisis and its
purpose was to achieve political unity in a fragile confederation. The framers
of the clause intended to achieve such unity by calming fears of religious
tyranny conjured by the image of a national church. That image must have
been shaped by the history of Anglican persecution of Protestant dissenters
in England and, perhaps, by the experience of Protestant dissent under
Roman Catholic religious hegemony. Exanumng this hlstorical experience
facilitates an understanding of the origins of the establishment clause.
At first glance, the continuity between the Act of Toleration and the
establishment clause may seem tenuous. The two are separated by one
hundred years, the Atlantic Ocean and, some would argue, by a gap in
political and governmental assumptions. It also is true that there is no
evidence to indicate that the. framers of the American Bill of Rights looked
directly to the Act of Toleration as a model when framing the religion
clauses of the first amendment. However, there is no doubt that those
present at the Constitutional Convention (1787) and the First Federal
Congress (1789) were aware of the whole Revolution Settlement of 1689especially the English Bill of Rights and the Act of Toleration.1 7 Furthermore, the passage of the Act of Toleration in England directly affected

57. See 3 Taa

DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON TE ADOPTIoN OF 7M

F aDmRA. CoNsTIruTION 314 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATEs] (Patrick Henry's
references to the English Bill of Rights and to the Glorious Revolution); 1 AmNALs OF CONo.,
supra note 5, at 436 (Madison's references to the English Declaration of Rights in the First
Federal Congress on June 8, 1789).
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colonial experience, for the laws of England were applied in the colonies,

if not with the same force as they were applied in the "Mother Country

"58

Analogies and continuities between 1689 and 1789 can be perceived in

other ways as well. In both periods there was a great fear of tyranny and
absolutism, 59 and an apprehension that the religious status quo might be
upset by a central government with strong policies concerning religion. 60 To
discover continuities between these two events is, of course, not to prove

that the political nature of one is to be found in the other; but in fact, the
Act of Toleration and the establishment clause are also similar in their
foundation in political motivation. 6' The framers of the establishment clause
spoke in terms as explicitly political as had their English counterparts one
hundred years earlier. 62 As in 1689, the language of religious toleration was
more appealing than that of political conformity because of the national
fear of absolutism in politics and religion.

58. See T. CURRY, Tim FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE
79 (1986).
59. In 1689 people feared a government like that of Louis XIV being introduced into
England by James II. J. MILIER, supra note 13, at 1. In 1789 the fear was of a strong central
government with tendencies like those of the government of George III. See G. WooD, THE
CREATION OF Tim AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 32-33 (1969).
60. In 1689 the Anglican majority feared a weakening of the position of their church m
England. See H. HoRwrrz, supra note 8, at 5; J. MILLER, supra note 8, at 169-75; J.MILLER,
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

supra note 13, at 209-13, 218-28. In 1789 many, both inside and outside of the First Federal
Congress, feared that the religious policies in force in their states would be subjugated to the
policies of the new central government if not wiped out by a national church. See 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 57, at 313-14, 317-18; 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 399; L.
LEVY, THE ESTABLISmENT CLAusE: RELIGION AND a FIRST AMENDMENT 66 (1986).
61. The Act of Toleration and the establishment clause are not unique in the history of
toleration policies. As noted before, English declarations of toleration from the Restoration
(1660) to the Act of Toleration (1689) were clearly marked with political purpose. See supra
note 6 (1660 Declaration of Breda, 1662, 1672 and 1687 Declarations of Indulgence). Another
striking example of the pervasiveness of the politics of toleration was to be found m twentiethcentury Rumania under its former leader Nicolae Ceausescu. Under Ceausescu, Rumaman
Jews were given an unprecedented amount of religious freedom; the freedom to emigrate to
Israel. The relationship between Ceausescu and the Rumaman Jews at first glance seems odd,
but on closer examination it makes sense, and the politics of toleration become clear. While
Rumanian Jews were allowed to emigrate freely to Israel, there was a price-between $2000
and $7000 for every emigrating person. It is thought that Ceausescu kept up to $50 million
for himself. In addition to the direct economic benefits, Ceausescu was able to attain mostfavored-nation status with the United States because of his toleration of Rumaman Jews.
Clearly, political motive lay behind this religious toleration. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1990, at
,6,
col. 3.
62. William III began his 1689 Act of Toleration by stating that "some ease to scrupulous
consciences in the exercise of religion may be an effectual means to unite their Majesties'
Protestantsubjects in interest and affection." 8 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTs, supra note
5, at 400 (emphasis added). In the 1789 congressional debates, Delegate Carroll asserted that
the establishment clause "would tend more towards conciliating the minds of the people to

the Government than almost any other amendment." 1 ANNALS
730.

OF CONG.,

supra note 5, at
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The language of religious freedom enabled the framers of the Bill of
Rights to attain their goal of political unity63 by quieting fears of a powerful
national government and of the potential emergence of one national church.
To those interested in using the original intent of the framers to inform
modem jurisprudence, the explicitly political language used by the framers
in their debates in Congress and in the Constitutional Convention must be
significant. Madison urged debate on the Bill of Rights in Congress not to
create a barrier between church and state but to ensure "that a reumon
should take place as soon as possible" 64between those states that ratified
the Constitution and those that did not.
A.

HistoricalContext of the Establishment Clause

The wall of separation that modern Supreme Court doctrine has erected
between church and state is consonant neither with the political history
surrounding the establishment clause nor with an eighteenth-century understanding of the interaction between the spiritual and the political realms.
Political turmoil and constitutional crisis were the backdrop for the framing
of the establishment clause, just as they had been for the Act of Toleration.
Like William III, the framers of the establishment clause were faced with
the task of constructing a constitutional explanation for their new government and unifying their nation behind that new government. The framers
of the American Constitution and Bill of Rights were confronted with an
even more difficult political enterprise than their English predecessors because the United States had never been a unified nation. It is likely that
the political necessity of unification was the driving force behind the
establishment clause of the Bill of Rights since, as one member of the First
Federal Congress commented, this amendment "would tend more towards
conciliating the minds of the people to the Government than almost any
6
other amendment."
The history of the Confederation immediately after the Revolutionary
War is a history of fragmented power and discordant policies. Under the
Articles of Confederation the individual states retained independence from
the Continental Congress, and at times went so far as to behave as though
they were not subject to its power in any way.6 Not only did states flaunt

63. Certainly there were those in 1789, as there were in 1689, who must have supported
the establishment clause for spiritual reasons. However, the reason most frequently stated in

the Congress of 1789 for the enacting of the Bill of Rights m general and for the enacting of
the establishment clause itself is unification of the country behind the new Constitution. See
1 ANwALs OF CoNo., supra note 5, at 431-32, 440-42, 704 (discussing the Bill of Rights

generally); d. at 730 (discussing the establishment clause).
64. Id. at 432.
65. Id. at 730 (statement of Daniel Carroll of Maryland).
66. See G. WooD, supra note 59, at 356.
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express provisions of the Articles of Confederation by "making war, providing for armies, laying embargoes, [and] even in some cases carrying on
separate diplomatic correspondence and negotiations abroad," 67 but there
were also strong sentiments in the early 1780s against a complete umon.s
The smaller states feared being overpowered, and perhaps feared eventual
subjugation, by the larger states if a strong union were ever formed in
which each state did not remain a 'distinct person."' 69
The resistance to political union, which had been present even during the
war, became significantly more pronounced after the war had ended. The
Continental Congress may have been a powerful policymaker for the whole
Confederation while English armies threatened the colonies, but it rapidly
lost power in peacetime. By the middle of the 1780s "Congress had virtually
ceased trying to govern." ' 70 It is not surprising that the states, which had
so recently gained independence from their "English oppressors," were not
eager to surrender it to a strong central government.
With the English threat no longer omnipresent, tensions among the states
became more pronounced than their common interests. The records of
debates in the Continental Congress during 1787 reveal the tension between
large states and small states.7' There were also tensions between the slaveholding southern states and the northern states which resulted in the "slave
comprormse" provision of the Constitution in article I, section 9.72 There
were also tensions stemming from the widely varied denominations and
religious policies to be found in the original thirteen states. 73 The AntiFederalists seized upon this tension stemmng from religious differences
among the states as a powerful tool to block ratification, and played upon
it heavily during the ratification debates. 74 The fear of religious subjugation,

67.
68.
69.
behalf

Id. at 356-57.
See id. at 357.
Id. Here John Witherspoon, Roger.Sherman and Stephen Hopkins were speaking on
of the small states against the strong umon for which John Adams was arguing. See

id.
70. Id. at 359.
71. See id. at 357; 3 ELIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 314-15.
72. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl.1. For tensions between the northern and southern
states, see 3 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 57, at 314-15, 322.
73. See T. CURRY, supra note 58, at 105-06; Lovejoy, The GloriousRevolution in America,
in THE AGE OF Wuj_ AND MARY: POWER, PoLIncS, AND PATRONAGE 1688-1702, at 71
(1989).
74. Patrick Henry insisted:
These most important human nghts [liberty of conscience, liberty of press, trial
by jury] are not protected by that section [section mne], which is the only
safeguard in the Constitution. My mind will not be quieted till I see something
substantial come forth in the shape of a Bill of Rights.
3 ELLioT's DEBATES, supra note 57, at 462. Henry later demanded:
Wherefore is religious liberty not secured?
There is many a religious man
who knows nothing of argumentative reasomng; there are many of our most
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which the Anti-Federalists had stirred, drove the framers of the establishment
clause in their aim to achieve support and unity.75
As early as 1783 it was clear to Some that strong state governments were
no substitute for a strong central government, and it was this that the
Articles of Confederation had failed to produce.7 6 By 1787 the restructuring
of the central government was recognized as a project of foremost impor77
tance if the newly united colomes were to develop into a single country.
Outside the halls of Congress Thomas Dawes of Massachusetts told listeners
that instability in the states would continue 'should our National Independence remain deprived of its proper federal authority. '' 78 Repeatedly in
the ratification debates, unification, union and unity were touted as the
most important goal of the new government and its constitution: Even the
Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry stated, "I have heard no word so often
pronounced in this house as [union]..
. I admit that the American Union
is dear to every man. I admit that every man, who has three grains of
information, must know and think that union is the best of all things. 7 9
B.

The Bill of Rights and the Establishment Clause as Tools to

Achieve Consensus
In 1787, consolidation of the disparate states into a strong union was
uppermost in the rmnds of the framers. 80 The recognition of the vital
importance of union by the staunch Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry"' makes
the contemporary consensus on this point even more striking.
The chances for political unity were threatened by the powerful force of
the Anti-Federalists who insisted that the new Constitution would be unacceptable without a Bill of Rights. In the ratification debates, "Patrick
Henry, one of the most dramatic and skillful Anti-Federalists, drew upon
his impressive oratorical powers to prey on the apprehensions aroused by

worthy citizens who cannot go through all the labyrmths of syllogistic, argumentative deductions, when they think that the rights of conscience are invaded. This
sacred right ought not to depend on constructive, iogical reasoning.
Id. at 317. As Thomas Curry points out, "Patrick Henry, one of the most dramatic and
skillful Anti-Federalists, drew upon his impressive oratorical powers to prey on the apprehensions aroused by the omission of specific guarantees
"T. CuRRY,supra note 58, at 194-

95.
75. See I ANNAlS OF CONo., supra note 5, at 730.
76. G. WOOD, supra note 59, at 436.
77. See id. at 466.
78. Id. (emphasis in original).
79. 3 EzOT's DEBATES, supra note 57, at 318.
80. James Wilson of Pennsylvama went so far as to suggest that "[t]he very manner of
introducing this Constitution, by the recognition of the authority of the people, is said to
change the principle of the present Confederation, and to introduce a consolidating and
absorbing government." 2 ELUOT'S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 455 (emphasis in original).
81. See id. at 313, 318.
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the omission of specific guarantees, such as that of religious freedom."'

2

The work of Anti-Federalists like Henry was effective. By 1789, Federalists,
who believed that no Bill of Rights was necessary, "were willing to go

along with the idea of a Bill of Rights in order to ease the minds of those
who feared the powers of the national government and to neutralize accu-

sations that the Constitution menaced religious freedom." ' 3
4
Recogmzing that political unification was the "greater consideration"
of the framers in 1787 makes it easier to understand that the same desire
for unification must have played a role in the framing of the Bill of Rights
two years later, despite the opimon of many of the framers that a Bill of
Rights was not only unnecessary but dangerous. 5 The refusal of six of the
thirteen states to ratify the Constitution without a Bill of Rights should
have made it clear to the framers that political consensus6 could be achieved
only by appending a Bill of Rights to the Constitution.1

The framers of the Bill of Rights were aware of the political utility of
their endeavor in 1789. As a whole, they conceived of the Bill of Rights as
a tool to promote political consensus. s7 The establishment clause is no
exception to that general rule. Delegates to the First Federal Congress (1789)
suggested that the proposal for the establishment clause was the most
effective way to unify the country behind the new government."8 James
Madison, a staunch opponent of the Bill of Rights in 1787,19 supported the

establishment clause in 1789 because it "had been required by some of the
State Conventions" which feared usurpation of state authority over religious
matters by the new federal government.

°

Madison's new-found support for

82. T. CuRRY, supra note 58, at 194-95.
83. Id.
84. See 3 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 57, at 313.
85. In 1787, James Wilson asserted that "the truth is, a bill of rights would, as I have
mentioned already, have been not only unnecessary, but improper." 2 ELUioT's DEBATES, supra
note 57, at 453. In 1789, Mr. Sherman stated that he "thought the amendment altogether
unnecessary." 1 ANNALS O CONG., supra note 5, at 730.
86. See L. LEvy, supra note 60, at 66.
87 See 1 ANNALS Or CONG., supra note 5, at 431-32, 439-42, 704, 730. As Thomas Curry
points out: "Repeatedly, in his [Madison's] correspondence, as well as in his speeches, he
asserted that he sought achievable amendments that would eschew controversy and gain
ratification of three-fourths of the states, and that he would oppose any proposal that altered
the Constitution." T. CuiuY, supra note 58, at 205.
88. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 5, at 730. Delegate Carroll stated that "it would
tend more toward conciliating the minds of the people to the Government than almost any
other amendment." Id.
89. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 330.
90. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 5, at 730. Madison's argument for the establishment
clause runs in full:
Whether the words are necessary or not he did not mean to say, but they had
been required by some of the State Conventions, who seemed to entertain an
opinion that under the clause of the Constitution, which gave power to Congress
to make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the Constitution,
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the establishment clause seems to have been based on political utility rather
than a conviction that liberty of conscience was in real danger. 91 Delegate
Carroll's suggestion that the political utility of the establishment clause
secured his support for the clause is striking by itself, but its force is even
more apparent when his language is compared with that of his seventeenth
century English counterparts.9 As in 1689 (as well as in 1660, 1662, 1672
and 1687), the politics of toleration in 1789 were the politics of civic unity
and social amity. 93
It would be unfair to the framers of the Bill of Rights to assume, from
the three pages of printed debates on the establishment clause which we
have mherited, 94 that their only motivation in adding the establishment
clause to the Bill of Rights was political utility. There must have been men
who supported this amendment out of religious scruple or moral conviction.
In the Continental Congress of 1787 these men stood alongside the AntiFederalists in calling for amendments to the Constitution to better secure
liberty of conscience. 95 Delegate Tredwell from New York stated that he
wished that "sufficient caution had been used to secure to us our religious
liberties, and to have prevented the general government from tyrannizing

and the laws made under it enabled them to make laws of such a nature as
might infringe the rights of conscience, and establish a national religion; to
prevent these effects he presumed the amendment was intended, and he thought
it as well expressed as the nature of the language would admit.

Id.
91. See rd. Leonard Levy also suggests:
Not even Madison himself, dutifully carrying out his pledge to secure amendments,
seems to have troubled to do more than was necessary to get something adopted
in order to satisfy the popular clamor for a bill of rights and deflate AntiFederalist charges that the new national government imperiled liberty.
L. LEwV, supra note 60, at 79.
92. Charles II stated that because there were several "opimons in religion, by which men
are engaged in parties and animosities against each other, which, when they shall hereafter
unite in a freedom of conversation, will be composed." 8 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DocuMENTs,
supra note 5, at 58. James II stated that "we so earnestly desire as to establish our government
unite them [Englishmen] to us by inclination as well as
on such a foundation as may
duty; which we think can be done by no means so effectually as by granting to them the free
exercise of their religion." Id. at 395. William III stated that "some ease to scrupulous
consciences in the exercise of religion may be an effectual means to unite their Majesties'
Protestant subjects." Id. at 400. Delegate Carroll said that the establishment clause "would
tend more towards conciliating the minds of the people to the Government than almost any
other amendment he had heard proposed." 1 ANNALs OF CONG., supra note 5, at 730.
93. The establishment clause did not mark the first time that toleration had been used for
political purposes in America. By 1692, Congregationalist Massachusetts had been forced by
England to adopt the Act of Toleration. T. CuiuY, supra note 58, at 79. Cotton Mather's
apparent acceptance of this novel situation in his sermon Optanda has been termed 'mainly
[that] proved that New England was theoretically tolerant, but not that
a political device
it actually tolerated."' Id. at 84 (quoting historian Perry Miller).
94. See I ANNAls OF CONG., supra note 5, at 729-33.
95. See 2 ELLioT's DEBATES, supra note 57, at 148, 399; 3 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note
57, at 317-18, 462, 645.
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over our consciences by a religious establishment-a tyranny of all others
most dreadful.'' 96 On the related question of religious tests for office, the
Reverend Backus from Massachusetts proclaimed his aversion to these tests
on spiritual and Scriptural grounds. 97
Men with beliefs similar to those of Reverend Backus and Delegate
Tredwell did not speak up in 1789 when the amendment of the establishment
clause to the Constitution was being debated by their more politically minded
colleagues. 98 It may be assumed, however, that such men were sitting in the
halls of Congress, and that they were voting on the proposed amendments.
While there is some evidence to indicate that political utility was not the
only intent of those framing the establishment clause, 99 there is nothing to
support the modern Court's assertion that it was the intent of the framers,
in 1789, to erect a wall of separation between church and state.100 And
there is little in the debates of 1787 to support the modem Court's
doctrine. 01
With so little evidence pointing to a specifically religious or spiritual
intent, it seems foolhardy to discount the clear evidence of political motivation. The framers said they were amending the establishment clause to
the Constitution in order to promote political concord, and neither the
phrase, nor the idea of, a wall of separation was mentioned.1°2 Unless we
turn a blind eye to the words of the framers during the debates on the
establishment clause, 103 we must recognize that political unity played an
important role in the original intent behind the clause.
C.

Toleration, Church and State: A Contemporary Understanding

The framers of the Bill of Rights did not conceive of the establishment
clause devoid of context. The eighteenth-century understanding of toleration
and of the proper relation between church and state were a part of that
context. As was the case in late seventeenth-century England, the popular

96. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 399.

97. Id. at 148.
98. See I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 5, at 729-33.
99. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
IO. See id.
101. There are some statements, like one of the Reverend Backus, which, taken out of
context, might suggest that the speaker envisioned a wall of separation between church and
state. "[N]othing is more evident, both in reason and the Holy Scnptures, than that religion
is ever a matter between God and individuals." 2 ELIUOT'S DEBATES, supra note 57, at 148.
However, when these statements are read in their full context there does not seem to be an
all encompassing separation of church from state intended. Rather, the speakers seem merely
to be setting out areas into which government should not presume to intrude. In the above
quote, Reverend Backus was objecting to the suggestion of a religious test for office. He did
not end his oration by announcing the necessity of a wall of separation between church and
state. See id.
102. See 1 ANNAIS OF CONG., supra note 5, at 729-33.
103. See id.
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understanding of toleration in eighteenth-century America was distinctly
Protestant.0 While the framers of the establishment clause did not, as had
William III, explicitly exclude certain sects from their offer of toleration,105
it is unlikely that their understanding of the scope of toleration was as
expansive as is the modem understanding of the same term.106 Indeed, it is
hardly likely that the modem Court's doctrine prohibiting the advancement
of religion over nonreligion'07 would have found much support in 1789.108
Although there is no direct evidence that the framers intended to exclude
atheists from the sweep of the establishment clause, it is improbable that
the original intent supports this modem doctrine.
If toleration in eighteenth-century America did not mean what it is
generally understood to mean today, it should not be surprising that the
eighteenth-century understanding of the relation between church and state
was not as it is generally conceived of today. In the Congregationalist
colomes of New England it was one of the duties of the magistrate to
"protect and promote religion."'' 9 Indeed, in 1722 John Hancock insisted
that magistrates 'have a power of Jurisdiction over Churches, and ought
by their Laws to provide for the Worship of God, to root out Heresies,
[and] to prevent Schisms and Rents in the Church of God. ' 110The close
relation between church and state is also evidenced by the continuation of
taxation in support of religion even after the Act of Toleration brought
liberty of conscience to the colomes. 11' Further, in 1789 it generally was
agreed that designation of days of prayer, Sabbath laws and appointment
of chaplains were within the purview of government.11 2 If the framers
accepted state taxation in support of religion and state control over matters

104. See T. CuraY, supra note 58, at 79.
105. The fact that the framers did not feel at liberty to specifically exclude Catholics and
non-Trinitanan Protestants from the scope of the religion clauses of the first amendment is
not surprising. The framers were faced with uniting a country in which there was a much
greater "diversity of opinion and variety of sects" than there had been in England in 1689. 3
ELiuoT's DEBATES, supra note 57, at 645.
106. If it were not for the framers' broad and vague wording of the religion clauses of the
first amendment the modern scope of toleration could not be as broad as it is. It would not
encompass all denominations as well as giving protection to those who choose not to believe
at all, but instead it would be a Chrstian-centered toleration.
107. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
108. See T. Cytn¢, supra note 58, at 79. Reverend Moses Dickinson spok'e for most of his
contemporaries when he asserted that it was 'absurd, to speak of allowing atheists Liberty
of Conscience."' Id. Similarly, Cotton Mather insisted that 'no pretence of conscience' could
justify living 'without any worship of God, or to Blaspheme and revile his Blessed Name."'
Id. at 85.
109. Id. at 85.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 89; Lovejoy, supra note 73, at 71-76. It must be kept in mind that while
taxation in support of religion was commonplace in the colonies, the framers never intended
to extend that power to the federal government. T. Cumay, supra note 58, at 216.
112. See T. CuRRY, supra note 58, at 218-19.
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concerning religion, they could not have intended a complete separation of
church from state.
Furthermore, the framers' actions in 1787 and 1789 belie the assertion
that they intended a complete separation of church from state. While the
Federalists repeatedly asserted that the new government had no power to
regulate, control or orgamze religion, the mention of "God, Jesus Christ,
the Christian religion, and many other religious references" populate the
pages of the proceedings of the Continental Congress, l1 3 a Congress that
considered funding for an American Bible.1 4 Congress, then as now, ap5
pointed chaplains for its own Houses and for the armed forces." Most
striking of all the examples of the intertwimng of church and state in 1789
was the proposal by both Houses of Congress for a day of public thanksgiving and prayer in recognition of "the many signal favors of Almighty
God." 16 This proposal followed immediately after the passage of the Bill
7
of Rights."
The framers used toleration outside of its spiritual context to achieve
political consensus;" 8 however, it is unlikely that they intended to discard
or alter the contemporary understanding of toleration, or of the proper
relationship between church and state. In the eighteenth century the proper
relation between church and state was one of intertwined, rather than
separated, institutions." 9 While the framers perceived the role of the federal
government in religious matters as more circumscribed than that of the state
governments, 20 there is no doubt that there was some role for the federal
government.' 2' The context of eighteenth-century meamng and of political
intent casts doubt on the modem Court's "wall of separation," unless that
doctrine is founded on sometlung other than original understanding.
III.
A.

THE MODERN DocTRINE

Everson v. Board of Education

The Supreme Court's modern establishment clause doctrine was first
announced in Everson v. Board of Education.1'2 For this Note, Everson's

113. Id. at 217
114. See id.

115. See id.at 218.
116. 1 DOCUumNTARY HISTORY OF

THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-91, at 197 (L. DePauw
ed. 1972) [hereinafter THm FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS]; see 3 id. at 238.
117 See T. CURRy, supra note 58, at 217
118. See supra notes 61-64, 80-103 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
120. See L. LEvy, supra note 60, at 65; T. CuRRY, supra note 58, at 216.
121. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
122. 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see G. GuNurHR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1465 (11th ed. 1985). That
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importance lies in the fact that its assumptions about original intent and
the meaning of the establishment clause have been the basis for all of the
Court's subsequent analyses of this provision. The later cases have not
questioned the Court's assumption that the framers intended the establishment clause to separate church and state'23 or that the establishment clause's
restrictions apply equally to the states and the federal government.' 2'
The Everson Court states, with no historical analysis, that "the provisions
of the First Amendment ... had the same objective and were intended to
provide the same protection against governmental intrusion in religious
matters" as had the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty.' 2' This assertion of
"historical fact" is doubtful at best. Although Madison and Jefferson
played prominent roles in drafting both the Virginia Bill for Religious
Liberty and the Constitution,' 26 it was not Madison who called for the
establishment clause.2 7 Further, it is unlikely that the New England states
would have supported the establishment clause if it had meant, as the
Virginia Bill had,'2 that states could no longer provide public support for

there was no real establishment clause litigation before Everson lends support to the notion
that the establishment clause was adopted for political purposes rather than out of necessity.
See supra notes 61-64, 80-103 and accompanying text. At the very least, the lack of establishment clause litigation for 150 years after the clause's framing suggests that Madison and the
Federalists were correct when they insisted that no protection for religion, outside of the
original Constitution, was necessary. Id.
123. It is true that in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), Chief Justice Burger
asserted that we "must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrer." Id. at 614. However, even here the Court did not
completely dismantle the wall of separation. Chief Justice Burger again sought to temper the
rigidity of the "wall of separation" concept in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984).
Chief Justice Burger cited his language from Lemon and then suggested that in establishment
clause cases the Court must "reconcile the inescapable tension between the objective of
preventing unnecessary intrusion of either the church or the state upon the other, and the
reality that
total separation of the two is not possible." Id.
124. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086
(1989); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Lynch, 465 U.S. 668; Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388 (1983); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,
459 U.S. 116 (1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
125. Everson, 330 U.S. at 13.
126. See T. CuRRY, supra note 58, at 146.
127. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
128. See T. Cuiu Y,supra note 58, at 146. The Virginia Bill which passed in 1786 "prohibited
any connection between religious belief and officeholding, forbade government to demand that
its citizens attend or maintain any religious institution whatsoever, and decreed that any reversal
of its provisions would violate the 'natural rights of mankind."' Id.
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religion or maintain an established church.12 9 The establishment clause was
"aimed at allaying apprehensions on the part of those states that maintained
their own establishments of religion."' 310 It was not aimed at promoting the
modern views of religious liberty espoused by Madison and Jefferson. 3 '
The Everson Court went on to delineate the meaning of the establishment
clause. 3 2 What constitutes the source of this meaning for the Court is not
clear. The meaning the Court discovers is not found on the face of the
establishment clause, 33 nor is the Court's reading obvious from the historical
context surrounding its framing.'1' The Court attempts to attribute its
definition to the framers by asserting that, "[iun the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a
'wall of separation between church and State." ' 3 However, Jefferson's
"wall of separation" was neither contemporary with the framing of the
establishment clause,' 36 nor would it have been acceptable to those for whom
the establishment clause was crafted. 37 In fact, the Senate Journal entries
for September 3, 1789 suggest that the religion clauses were seen simply as
a bar against the establishment of a national church and against the
preference of one sect by the federal government 3 The delegates do not
seem to have been concerned with erecting an impenetrable wall between
church and state, or with eliminating all governmental aid to religion.
Another disturbing aspect of Everson is the Court's application of the
establishment clause to the states without explanation or analysis. 39 From
129.
130.
131.
132.

See id. at 164, 173, 175, 183, 189.
L. Livy, supra note 60, at 76.
See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. The Court says:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be pumshed for entertaimng or professing religious beliefs
or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion
by law was intended to erect a "wall of separation between church and State."
Id. (emphasis in onginal) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
133. The establishment clause merely says "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
134. See supra notes 65-80 and accompanying text.
135. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
136. Jefferson's letter describing the "wall of separation" was written in 1802, thirteen
years after the framing of the establishment clause. See L. LEWr, supra note 4, at 7-8.
137. See supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
"138. See I TiE FmsT FEDERAL CONoREss, supra note 116, at 151, 166.
139. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. The Court merely starts its definition of the establishment clause: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government
" Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
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the text of the establishment clause, ,it
is clear that this provision was aimed

exclusively at limiting federal power. 140 Further, incorporation through the
fourteenth amendment seems untenable in light of the historical contexf of
the clause.' 4' The first amendment was enacted because it was "required by
some of the State Conventions. ' 142 It was adopted because it "tend[ed]
more towards conciliating the minds of the people to the Government than
almost any other amendment."' 143 The framers were not concerned with
protecting individual liberty, but with "allaying apprehensions on the part
of those states that maintained their own establishments of religion."1""
Original intent cannot be used to support the incorporation of the estab4
lishment clause against the states through the fourteenth amendment.
B.

Later Developments

There have been two major developments in the Court's establishment
clause doctrine since Everson; however, neither of these levelopments
questioned Everson's analysis of the original intent behind the establishment
clause. The first development was the formulation of a standard test for
establishment clause cases. This test was first announced fully in Lemon v.
Kurtzman. "4 Although Lemon is certainly important to the Supreme Court's
analysis of establishment clause cases, its innovations are not important for

140. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first words of this amendment are "Congress shall
make no law." Id.
141. States continued to designate days of prayer, draft Sabbath laws and appoint chaplains.
See T. CtRY, supra note 58, at 218-19. Some states even continued to tax in support of
religion and maintain an established church after 1789. Id. at 164, 173, 175, 183, 189. Thus,
the establishment clause looks more like a protection of states' rights rather than a protection
of individual liberty. See Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court:Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling
Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 Dux L.J. 770, 772-79. It hardly makes sense
to apply a federalism amendment against the states.
142. 1 ANNiis op CoNo., supra note 5, at 730.
143. Id.
144. L. LEvy, supra note 60, at 76.
145. Van Alstyne argues that incorporation is acceptable because by the 1830s the last of
the state-established churches had disappeared leaving the establishment clause applicable to
the states with the passage of the fourteenth amendment in 1868. See Van Alstyne, supra note
141, at 778-79. I agree with Van Alstyne that the establishment clause should be applied to
the states; however, that goal cannot be accomplished by incorporation through the fourteenth
amendment because the jurisprudence of original intent cannot accommodate the use of an
amendment not in existence at the time of the framing. The framers' intent to promote
political unity would lose its force if the establishment clause were not applied to the states
because of the structure of our society today and the fluidity of state boundaries. Further, it
makes sense to apply the establishment clause to the states because the framers' political
purpose for not applying tis clause to the states no longer exists after fifty years of activist

application to the states.
146. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon three-pronged test requires: (1) a secular legislative
purpose, (2) a principle or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion and (3)
the statute must not create excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13.

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:773

this Note. What is important is that Lemon did not question Everson's
creation of a "wall of separation" between church and state, nor its assertion
that the establishment clause applied to both state and federal government. 4 7
In fact, the wall of separation is incorporated into the Lemon test through
4
its third prong. 1
The other major doctrinal innovation since Everson was Justice O'Connor's development of an alternative establishment clause test in Lynch v.
Donnelly 149 Like the Lemon test, Justice O'Connor's test does not question
Everson's assumptions about the framers' intent with respect to the establishment clause. 150 Because of its acceptance of Everson's "wall of separation" and its application of the establishment clause to the states, Justice
O'Connor's test does not alter this Note's analysis of modem Court doctrine.
Justice O'Connor's test, like Lemon's, neither takes the framers' intent into
account nor acknowledges that the Court's establishment clause doctrine is
based on something other than the jurisprudence of original intent.' 5'
The politics of toleration have not yet been recogmzed by the modern
Court. 5 2 However, in recent establishment clause cases Chief Justice Rehnquist began to acknowledge that the Court's doctrine is not consistent with
the original intent of the framers."' In Wallace v. Jaffree,154 Rehnquist
asserted that "unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly
1 55
It
freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years.'
is clear from the floor debates in 1789, Rehnquist explained, that for
Madison and the other delegates "[tihe evil to be aimed at
appears to

147 See id.
148. The third prong of the Lemon test required that there not be excessive government
entanglement with religion. Id.
149. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's test was first
announced in Lynch as a clarification of the Lemon test. Justice O'Connor asserts that the
"purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that the government activity have a secular
purpose." Id. at 690. This she interpreted as meaning that the government not subjectively
endorse religion. Justice O'Connor explained that the effect prong of the Lemon test means
that the government may not be perceived objectively to endorse religion. Id. at 690-92.
150. See id. at 687-94.
151. See id.
152. See supra notes 123-25, 132-38 and accompanying text.
153. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also
County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (Kennedy, J., concurrng in part and dissenting in part,
with whom the Chief Justice [Rehnquist] joins); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting, with whom the Chief Justice [Rehnquist] joins).
154. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
155. Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist explained:
Thomas Jefferson was of course in France at the time the constitutional Amendments known as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and ratified by the
States. His letter to the Danbury Baptist Association was a short note of courtesy,
written 14 years after the Amendments were passed by Congress. He would seem
to any detached observer as a less than ideal source of contemporary history as
to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
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have been the establishment of a national church, and perhaps the preference
of one religious sect over another; but it was definitely not concerned about
whether the Government might aid all religions evenhandedly 156 They did
not intend to erect a "wall" between church and state.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has moved far from Everson toward an interpretation of the establishment clause that comports with the intent of the
framers. However, he has stopped short. While Rehnquist recognizes that
57
the framers did not envision a complete separation of church from state,1
he has not acknowledged the political intent of the framers. And, disappointingly, Rehnquist accepts the application of the establishment clause to
the states on the strength of Everson without comment. 1 8
While Chief Justice Rehnquist is correct to question the "wall of separation," that issue must be balanced against the framers' desire to promote
political unity. From the quantity of litigation driven by those who object
to prayer in the schools and the use of public funds to support religion,
we must conclude that promotion of religion by either state or federal
government causes political and social disquiet. Rehnquist's analysis uses
the framers' intent to go only halfway through a complete historical"originalist"-analysis of the establishment clause. The world suggested by
Rehnquist's stopping point looks more like Anglican hegemony in Restoration England than like Revolutionary America, let alone America at the
close of the twentieth century. Rehnquist's analysis does not take into
account the diversity of opinion on spiritual matters in twentieth-century
America. Nor does it respond to the danger of social and political dislocation
that might be caused if even a non-denominational prayer were to be recited
in public school classrooms throughout the country.
The separation of church and state suggested by the early establishment
clause decisions, in fact, may be what is demanded by our society today to
promote political unity and social amity However, we must acknowledge
the accuracy of Chief Justice Rehnquist's challenge to the idea that strict
separation comports with original intent. And in turn, Rehnquist's reconstruction of original intent should be completed by re-emphasizing the
political goals and the political context of the establishment clause if a
jurisprudence of original intent is to be used at all.

156. Id. at 99.
157. Rehnquist explained:
The Establishment Clause did not require government neutrality between religion

and irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion. There is simply no histoncal foundation for the
proposition that the Framers intended to build the "wall of separation" that was
constitutionalized in Everson.
Id. at 106.
158. Id. at 113.
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CONCLUSION

The original intent of the framers of the establishment clause may tell us
much about what that amendment means and how it should be used.
Clearly, the framers did not intend to erect a wall of separation between
church and state. Their debates in Congress reveal this as do the historical
context of the establishment clause and the eighteenth-century understanding
of toleration and the proper relationship between church and state. However,
this is only a part of the original intent of the framers, and the other part
is as important. The framers not only intended to allow some intertwining
of the institutions of church and state, but they also intended to promote
political unity and stability and social amity by adding the establishment
clause to the Constitution. This aim has been ignored in modem establishment clause jurisprudence. The failure to recognize this aim may cause
conservative jurists to use the establishment clause improperly An mcomplete jurisprudence of original intent could be used to institute prayer m
the public schools, to use public funds to promote and support religion and
promulgate legislation which discriminates between those who adhere to a
religious faith and those who do not. These uses would violate the original
intent behind the establishment clause for they would create political disunity
and social disharmony.
As Professor Danel Conkle explained in a recent essay, there may be
much to recommend some measure of separation of church from state
despite the fact that this does not comport with original understanding. 5 9
Conkle points out that the modern doctrine "respect[s] the religious and
irreligious beliefs of individuals.
maintain[s] a political community that
embraces its members without regard to their religion . . [and supports]
the value of religion itself in American society "160 However, the Court
could promote these values by using a complete historical analysis of the
establishment clause. Today, to promote the framers' intent to foster
political and social unity, government must continue to allow a full measure
of toleration-the prevention of excessive government intrusion into the
sphere of religion. As the framers of the Act of Toleration recognized,
forced uniformity-such as that attempted by the Clarendon Code-is
dangerous. Seventeenth-century Englishmen came to understand that social
amity and political conformity could best be achieved by allowing some
measure of religious toleration. 61 The religious uniformity threatened by
mandatory prayer in the schools is just as dangerous today as the Clarendon
Code was in the seventeenth century The modern Court seems to recognize

159. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.L. REv
1113 (1988).
160. Id. at 1164.
161. See T. CuRRY, supra note 58, at 83.
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this in its current non-origmalist doctrine; however, the best and most
comprehensive judicial response to establishment clause cases rests on the
complete histoncal understanding of original intent.

